my book summary

The main process is the formation of a Palestinian national political consciousness. The secondary process, which was largely an outgrowth of the main process, is the development of a distinct civil society. The question of the hold of Palestinian nationalism among the Bedouin in the Negev occupies a prominent place in the broader context of the relations between them and the state and the Jewish-Zionist majority living in it.

During the War of Independence and the years that followed, most of the Bedouin residents of the Negev fled or were expelled. The groups that were allowed to remain or return at the end of the war were mostly those whose leaders agreed to cooperate with the state and assist in its security.

Due to the cooperation, and the absence of ideological-national criticism throughout most of the years of the military government from 1949 to 1966, the Bedouins in the Negev were perceived as 'loyal and disciplined' in their relationship to the state.
A few decades later, things had completely changed. During Operation "Guardian of the Walls" in May 2021, dozens of enthusiastic young people went out onto major traffic routes in the Negev, blocked them, attacked Jewish drivers, and even carried out several shooting attacks. A few more months passed, and in protest of KKL-JNF plantings in open areas, young Besouin clashed with security forces with great violence and caused serious damage.

These developments coincided with a continued increase in support among the Bedouin in the Negev for Palestinian nationalist parties, to the point that they won 94 percent of the vote in the elections for the Twenty-fifth Knesset.
Although many Bedouins in the Negev disapproved of the acts of violence, these riots did not arise out of thin air. They were the ultimate expression of the widespread hold of the Palestinian national idea in Bedouin society in the Negev. This idea had permeated the Bedouin in the Negev before the establishment of the state, but its validation after its establishment, as well as the establishment of political-civic institutions that enabled its expression, were the result of fascinating events that took place in the Negev between 1965 and 1981.

This process preceded other processes that also influenced the political question in the society in question. For example, marriage ties between Bedouins and residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Six-Day War. Following the marriages, many women moved to the country as part of family reunification and gave birth to offspring in which one side of the family is a resident of Israel and the other is a resident of the West Bank or Gaza Strip. Another important factor in shaping the political arena under discussion was the entry of the Islamic movement into the Negev.

In 1965, following contacts with Arabs outside the Negev, mainly through the education system, organizations of young people with Palestinian nationalist positions began to emerge among the Bedouin in the Negev. Against the backdrop of resistance to the state’s attempts to shape the face of Bedouin society in the Negev according to its needs – geographically, socially, and politically, these positions grew and gained public traction. Within this framework, prominent activists adopted new ways of organizing and developed Israeli-democratic practices of resistance.

Thus, out of the turbulent dynamics of complex relations with the state, and due to internal tensions within Arab society in the Negev, an organizational and ideological foundation took shape among the Bedouin in the Negev that challenged the state. It matured into political independence as early as 1981, after the assassination of Knesset member Sheikh Hamad Abu Rabia, a senior political figure in this community.

The place of the sheikh, who had a pragmatic dialogue with the government, was taken by the Association for the Assistance and Protection of Bedouin Rights in Israel, which advocated activism with a Palestinian nationalist tone. At the same time, the activities of the Bani Laqiya Association were also established, initiated by members of the Palestinian nationalist Abna'a al-Balad movement.

The expressions of these developments did not remain the preserve of activists in organizations or political elites, but as mentioned, gained traction among the general public. In the elections for the Eleventh Knesset in 1984, there was a dramatic increase in the voting rate of the Bedouins in the Negev for national-Palestinian parties, from 4.78 percent in the elections for the Tenth Knesset to 20.5 percent in the Eleventh Knesset.

This trend continued in the following elections. In 1988, Talab al-Sana, one of the founders of the Bani Lakiya Association and now the representative of the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) in the Negev, joined the Palestinian nationalist call. In these elections, support for Palestinian nationalist parties exceeded support for Jewish-Zionist parties for the first time since the establishment of the state, and it has grown over the years.

The first part of the doctoral dissertation was published as a chapter in the book "Bedouins in the Negev: Tribalism, Politics and Criticism," and is available for free download on the website of the Herzl Institute for the Study of Zionism at the University of Haifa at the link below.

I am currently working on the other parts of my doctoral dissertation for a book that will be published later this year. Alongside this work, I serve as a research fellow at the Institute for Counterterrorism Policy at the Reichman University School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy.